

AppArmor crash course and workshop

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What does AppArmor do?

The answer is simple ;-)

- allow applications to do only what they are supposed to do
- deny everything else

It isn't that easy! ;-)

- AppArmor must know what to allow





Why AppArmor?

- Bug-free and secure software would be ideal...

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Why AppArmor?

- Bug-free and secure software would be ideal...
- Programmers can't perform magic...
- so better keep an eye on what they are doing!
 - AppArmor monitors applications at the kernel level



Hands up! ;-)

- Who is using AppArmor?
- Who already created or updated a profile with Yast or the aa-* tools?
- Who already edited a profile with vi / \$EDITOR?
- Cross-check: Who did not use AppArmor yet?





Hello world!

- The unavoidable Hello World...

```
#!/bin/bash
echo "Hello World!" > /tmp/hello.txt
cat /tmp/hello.txt
rm /tmp/hello.txt
```

- now I'll create an AppArmor profile for it...

Hello world!

- The unavoidable Hello World...

```
#!/bin/bash  
echo "Hello World!" > /tmp/hello.txt  
cat /tmp/hello.txt  
rm /tmp/hello.txt
```

- **Caution - hacker!**





What does AppArmor do?

Monitor and restrict

- file access
- network access
- capabilities (chown, mknod, setuid, ...)
 - man 7 capabilities
- rlimit (aka ulimit)
- in general: restrict permissions



What DOESN'T AppArmor do?

- replace traditional file permissions
 - “chmod -R 777 /” is not a good idea
- replace user permissions
 - run as little as possible as root

for webserver:

- restrict MySQL database permissions
 - one MySQL user per hosting and task
- validate user input
 - validate input
 - escape input
 - php5-suhosin






Is my server secure now?

- Security consists of lots of small parts
- AppArmor protects you from lots of (but not all) exploits
- The server is definitely more secure than without AppArmor ;-)

YaST AppArmor module





aa-<tab><tab>: The AppArmor tools

- aa-unconfined
 - overview of protected/confined applications
- aa-genprof
 - create a new profile
- aa-logprof
 - modify an existing profile
- aa-complain
 - switch profile to learning (complain) mode
 - policy violations are logged, but not blocked
- aa-enforce
 - switch profile to enforce mode
 - policy violations are blocked (and logged)
- aa-notify



aa-unconfined: check the status

```
# aa-unconfined
1552 /usr/lib/postfix/smtpd confined by
'/usr/lib/postfix/smtpd (enforce)'
2879 /usr/sbin/avahi-daemon confined by
'/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon (enforce)'
2955 /usr/sbin/clamd confined by
'/usr/sbin/clamd (enforce)'
3541 /usr/bin/perl (amavisd (master))
confined by '/usr/sbin/amavisd (complain)'
3839 /usr/sbin/vsftpd not confined
...
```



aa-unconfined: check the status

- General rule of thumb: all daemons that are accessible from the internet should be protected

3839 /usr/sbin/vsftpd not confined

- It's time to fix this!



aa-genprof: create a profile

Use two xterms:


- first xterm: `aa-genprof /usr/sbin/vsftpd`
- second xterm: use the application

Tactics for creating the profile:

- `rcvsftpd start / stop`
 - gets the basics
 - keeps the log small
- use the application
- when finished, you might want to run the profile in complain mode for some time
 - especially when it comes to complex applications
 - use `aa-logprof` to update the profile

Execute options: ix


- inherit (ix)
 - run program with the same profile
 - for helper applications and shells (cat, grep, rm, bash)



Execute options: Cx




- child (Cx)
 - used for “foo called by bar”
 - doesn't confine standalone calls of foo
 - for helpers that need more or less permissions than the main application



Execute options: Px




- profile (Px)
 - separate profile for helpers
 - also used if the helper is called standalone
 - not a good idea for /bin/bash ;-)



Execute options: Ux

- unconfined (Ux)
 - execute helper applications without AppArmor protection
 - example: protect sshd, and provide an unrestricted shell after login



Execute options

Fallback rules if a profile doesn't exist

- Pix
- PUx
- Cix





Execute options

- named profile (Cx -> ..., Px -> ...)
 - allows specifying the target profile
 - multiple helper applications can use a common abstract profile



Execute options



Cleanup the environment?

- In general: yes
Rules: Cx, Px, Ux (uppercase)
- In exceptional cases keep all environment variables
Rules: cx, px, ux (lowercase)

audit.log

```
type=APPARMOR_ALLOWED  
msg=audit(1245789190.902:123): [...]
```

- add /var/log/audit/audit.log to logdigest
- “translate” the timestamp:
date -d @1245789190.902
- APPARMOR_DENIED - (blocked) violations of profiles in enforce mode
- APPARMOR_AUDIT - logging of audit rules
- APPARMOR_ALLOWED - profiles in complain mode
- APPARMOR_HINT ... operation="ptrace" - an application in complain mode forked



Apache mod_apparmor

- global configuration:
 `AADefaultHatName default_vhost`
 - otherwise AppArmor proposes a hat per file (!)
- per VirtualHost:
 `<VirtualHost 1.2.3.4>`
 `AADefaultHatName vhost_someone`
 - restricts each virtual host to itself
- for specific directories:
 `<Directory /some/where>`
 `AAHatName something`
 - recommended if multiple different software (CMS, Forum, ...) is used in one virtual host

Hats?

- Hats are similar to subprofiles
- An application can switch between them
- My typical usecase: Apache with a hat per virtual host
- Syntax inside a profile:
 `^hatname {`
 `...`
 `}`



mod_apparmor base configuration

- `/etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/vhost_cboltz:`
`/home/www/cboltz.de/conf/htpass-webstat r,`
`/home/www/cboltz.de/httpdocs/** r,`
`/home/www/cboltz.de/statistics/logs/access_log w,`
`/home/www/cboltz.de/statistics/logs/access_log-20?????? w,`
`/home/www/cboltz.de/statistics/logs/error_log w,`
`/home/www/cboltz.de/statistics/logs/error_log-20?????? w,`
`/home/www/cboltz.de/statistics/zugriffe/* r,`
`/home/www/cboltz.de/tmp/ r,`
`/home/www/cboltz.de/tmp/** rwk,`
`/dev/urandom r,`
`/proc/*/attr/current w,`
`/usr/share/apache2/error/** r,`
`/usr/share/zoneinfo/ r,`



mod_apparmor specialities

- Generate abstractions/vhost_someone automatically
 - saves lots of time compared with manually creating a profile/hat per virtual host
- ^HANDLING_UNTRUSTED_INPUT tends to do more than planned
 - this hat wants write access to the access_logs and error_logs of all virtual hosts
- “Tightness” of the profile is relevant
 - real world example: a forum allowed to upload avatar photos - including *.php...
- “deny owner /**.php rw” can protect against freshly uploaded exploits
 - also blocks valid scripts if owned by wwwrun



Creative usage of AppArmor

- AppArmor as inventory list:
 - which vHost uses which scripts in the server-wide shared directory?
 - which vHost sends mails? (by calling sendmail)
 - ...
- AppArmor as debugging tool:
 - which files does application foo read?
 - just let aa-genprof create a summary ;-)
- AppArmor as load monitor
 - “ps Zaux” shows which vHost is using/blocking an apache process
- read-only root access for backups



Backup: read-only for root

Two component solution:

- SSH key in `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`:
`command="/root/bin/rsync-shell" ssh-dss 7j1ntgRxts8X...`
- `/root/bin/rsync-shell`:

```
#!/bin/bash
echo "cmd=$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND" |
    logger -t rsync-backup
echo "$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND" |
    grep "^rsync --server --sender" \
    >/dev/null \
    && exec $SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
```



Backup: read-only for root

- The corresponding AppArmor profile (slightly shortened):

```
/root/bin/rsync-shell {  
    #include <abstractions/base>  
    #include <abstractions/bash>  
    #include <abstractions/consoles>  
    #include <abstractions/nameservice>  
    capability dac_override,  
    capability dac_read_search,  
    /bin/bash rix,  
    /bin/grep rix,  
    /bin/logger Px,  
    /root/bin/rsync-shell mr,  
    /usr/bin/rsync rix,  
}
```

```
/etc/ r,  
/etc/** r,  
/home/ r,  
/home/** r,
```



More information...

- <http://en.opensuse.org/SDB:AppArmor>
- <http://apparmor.net/>
- openSUSE Security Guide
<http://doc.opensuse.org/documentation/html/openSUSE/opensuse-security/part.apparmor.html>
- Mailinglist: apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com
- Download the profiles I use on servers at
<http://blog.cboltz.de/plugin/tag/apparmor>
(slightly outdated)

Questions?

Get your hands dirty!

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